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DEPORTATION: PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF
REENTERING PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIENS
SUBJECTED TO EXCLUSION HEARINGS
INTRODUCTION
Aliens admitted for permanent residence' in the United States enjoy
substantial constitutional protections. 2 Despite the extent of these pro-
tections, permanent residents are subject to deportation by the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) in certain circumstances.
The deportation procedures3 of the INS raise the issue whether these
constitutional protections accompany and return with a permanent
resident who temporarily leaves the country.
Deportability 4 is determined at either an exclusion hearing, if the
alien is apprehended at the border, or at an expulsion hearing, if the
1. The term "permanent resident" as used in this Note designates a lawful
permanent resident alien, defined by statute as one who maintains the "status of
having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United
States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not
having changed." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(20) (1976); see 8 C.F.R. §§ 101.1-.3 (1982). An
alien may apply for a visa for permanent residence, which is issued at United States
consulates or embassies after the applicant has fulfilled the requirements of the visa
procedure. H. Kapner & I. Field, Not For Illegal Aliens Only 2 (1978). A nonimmi-
grant, such as a visitor, may also become a permanent resident by having his status
adjusted within the United States. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.1 (1982).
2. See infra pt. III. Permanent resident aliens, by virtue of their acquired
status, enjoy significant constitutional protection in other contexts. See Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116-17 (1976) (barring'permanent residents from civil
service jobs violates due process); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-69 (1886)
(recognizing that Chinese permanent residents are entitled to equal protection).
Despite judicial and statutory declarations, however, these aliens are still not coequal
in some respects. 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure
§ 1.31 (1982).
3. This Note relates only to aliens who allegedly violate provisions of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), and
would therefore be subject to expulsion or exclusion procedures.
4. One may be "deported" from the United States after having been found
excludable or expellable. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.4 (1953).
"'"[E]xclusion' means preventing someone from entering the United States who is
actually outside the United States or is treated as being so. 'Expulsion' means forcing
someone out of the United States who is actually within the United States or is treated
as being so." Id. While various sources use the term "deportation" synonymously
with "expulsion," see Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 450-51 (1963) ("deporta-
tion" proceeding used to denote "expulsion" proceeding); 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981) (same); Note, Exclusion and Deportation of Resident Aliens: The Re-
Entry Doctrine and the Need for Reform, 13 San Diego L. Rev. 192, 192 (1975)
(same), this Note utilizes the term only in its generic sense. Thus, the term "expulsion
hearing" refers solely to proceedings within the United States, and the term "exclu-
sion hearing" refers solely to proceedings at the border.
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alien is found within the United States.- Expulsion proceedings afford
significantly greater procedural protection to aliens than do exclusion
proceedings.6 This enhanced protection is consistent with the practice
of applying constitutional safeguards to anyone who has, legally or
otherwise, entered the country.7
When a permanent resident crosses the border for a temporary trip
outside the United States, he may be subjected on his return to an
exclusion proceeding in which his procedural rights are essentially
limited to those held by first time entrants. Neither Congress,
through the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (Act),9 nor the
executive branch, through the INS, has seen fit to require a greater
degree of procedural protection for a reentering permanent resident
subject to exclusion proceedings. Furthermore, while the Supreme
Court has broadly construed the Act to permit permanent residents to
take "innocent, casual, and brief" trips across the border without
being regarded as entrants upon their return,10 the Court recently
5. Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 325-26 (1982). Compare 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (setting forth procedure in expulsion hearing) with id.
§ 1226 (1976) (setting forth procedure in exclusion hearing).
6. 'See infra pt. I(B). The lesser procedural protections afforded by exclusion
proceedings have been justified by the rationale that "[a]dmission of aliens to the
United States is a privilege granted by the sovereign United States Government,"
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950), and "[w]hat-
ever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien
denied entry is concerned." Id. at 544. This procedural distinction based on entry has
led to the anomalous situation in which aliens illegally within the United States are
entitled to expulsion hearings while aliens attempting to enter lawfully at the lorder
are subject to exclusion hearings. See W. Van Vleck, The Administrative Control of
Aliens 32 (1971) (surreptitious entry entitles alien to expulsion hearing). Compare In
re Phelisna, No. 82 Civ. 2112 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1982) (illegal alien, who intention-
ally and successfully evades inspection upon entry, subject only to expulsion hearing)
with Landon v.Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 328-29 (1982) (lawful permanent resident
returning via inspection station subject to exclusion hearing).
7. See Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2400-02 (1982) (illegal alien children
entitled to equal protection under fourteenth amendment); Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116-17 (1976) (holding that permanent resident aliens cannot be
barred from federal civil service jobs under due process clause of fifth amendment);
Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547-48 (1895) (holding that Constitu-
tion protects alien as long as he remains within the United States); Note, Constitu-
tional Limits on the Power to Exclude Aliens, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 957, 980 (1982)
(arguing that aliens detained pending exclusion hearings should have same constitu-
tional rights presently enjoyed by alien criminals within country) [hereinafter cited as
Constitutional Limits]; cf. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771-72 (1950)
(Chinese enemy aliens who have not stepped inside United States have no constitu-
tional rights).
8. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 328-29 (1982) (permanent
resident subject to exclusion); Palatian v. INS, 502 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1974)
(same).
9. 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-1557 (1970 & West Supp. 1983).
10. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 461 (1963).
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held that the character of their departure may properly be litigated in
exclusion proceedings as well as in expulsion proceedings.II
This Note examines the adequacy of the exclusion procedures as
they currently apply to reentering permanent residents. Proposals are
set forth that would guarantee this class a fairer hearing on critical
issues of deportability without infringing upon the important national
interests in administrative efficiency and the exclusion of undesirable
aliens. Part I distinguishes the procedural aspects of expulsion and
exclusion hearings as provided in the Act and in the regulations issued
by the INS. Part II discusses the evolution of the judicially created
reentry exception dealing with the substantive aspects of alien admis-
sibility, and the absence of a procedural counterpart to that exception.
Part III balances the government's interest in preserving the status quo
against the benefits of instituting additional procedural safeguards
such as those already available in expulsion proceedings.
I. EXPULSION AND EXCLUSION: STATUTORY
CATEGORIES AND PROCEEDINGS
Xenophobic restrictions on immigration developed in the nine-
teenth century as a result of racial and religious prejudice and of fear
that aliens in the work force would upset the economic stability of
American industry.12 The implied theory of sovereign power, supple-
mented by the constitutional grants of power to Congress to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and to establish uniform rules of
naturalization,' 3 was initially cited as authorization for federal con-
trol of the borders.14 By the 1880's Congress had exercised this power
in several ways,' 5 most significantly by entrusting the executive
11. Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 328-29 (1982). The Plasencia Court,
while affirming the validity of subjecting reentering permanent residents to exclusion
proceedings when detained at the border, expressly left open the question of whether
such proceedings sufficiently comport with due process. Id. at 329.
12. See H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-10 [hereinafter cited as House
Report], reprinted in 1952 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1653, 1655-60; 1 C. Gordon
& H. Rosenfield, supra note 2, § 1.2; XW. Van Vleck, supra note 6, at 3-8.
13. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cls. 3-4.
14. The Supreme Court early recognized that a sovereign's "[jlurisdiction over its
own territory ...is an incident of every independent nation. . . .If it could not
exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control of another power."
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 603-04
(1889); accord United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950);
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936); Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893); Constitutional Limits, supra note 7,
at 966-67 & n.69; see Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 591-92
(1884) (same). See generally Restatement of Foreign Relations Law § 722 reporters'
notes 1 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982) (sovereign power and constitutional authority to
regulate aliens).
15. Congress had acted: 1) to exclude Chinese resident laborers who had previ-
ously obtained statutory permission to return to the United States, see Chae Chan
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branch with sole and exclusive authority to regulate alien admissibil-
ity.'6 Thus, as long as an immigration officer did not abuse his discre-
tion in determining an alien's deportability from the United States, his
judgment was final and not subject to judicial review.' 7 This latitude
in decision-making applied to hearings conducted at the border as
well as to hearings conducted within the country.'
A. Categories for Expellability and Excludability
Any alien within the United States may be subjected to expulsion
hearings if he falls within one or more of nineteen categories enumer-
ated in the Act."9 An alien attempting to enter the United States at an
authorized border crossing may be subjected to exclusion hearings if
he falls within one or more of thirty-three enumerated categories.2 0
Certain aliens, such as smugglers and anarchists, fall within both
expulsion and exclusion categories and may therefore be subjected to
Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 599 (1889); 2) to
refuse reentry to a lawful resident alien on the basis that his constitutional rights were
protected only on United States soil, see Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S.
538, 547-48 (1895); and 3) to override the effect of treaties by passing restrictive
legislation, see Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130
U.S. 581, 599-601 (1889); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 554 (1884).
16. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214 (repealed 1966): Act
of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. (pt. 3) 477 (superseded 1907): see Nishimura Ekiu
v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) ("[D]etermination of [facts relevant to
deportation] may be entrusted by Congress to executive officers . . . [who are] the
sole and exclusive judge[s] .... ").
17. Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U.S. 673, 675 (1912); see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.
67, 81-82 (1976) (narrow judicial review of immigration matters); United States ex
rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950) ("[It is] not within the province
of any court ... to review the determination of the political branch ... to exclude a
given alien.").
18. Compare Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case),
130 U.S. 581, 599 (1889) (laborers excluded by statute) with Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 699 & n.1 (1893) (laborers expelled by statute).
19. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)-(19) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Included in these
categories, for example, are aliens who were legally excludable at the time of entry
but who nonetheless were admitted into the country, id. § 125 1(a)(1) (1976), aliens
who entered the United States without proper inspection, id. § 1251(a) (2), aliens who
become public charges within five years of entry, id. § 1251(a)(3), aliens who are
convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and are imprisoned for a year or more within
five years of entry, or who at any time after entry are convicted of two crimes of
moral turpitude, id. § 1251(a)(4), aliens who are or have been, after entry, anar-
chists, Communists, subversives, etc., id. § 1251(a)(6), and aliens who, at any time
prior to entry and within five years after entry, knowingly and for gain encouraged,
assisted or aided any other alien to enter the United States illegally, id. § 1251 (a)(13).
20. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)-(33) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). These include, for
example, aliens who are mentally retarded, id. § 1182(a)(1) (1976), are insane, id.
§ 1182(a)(2), are drug addicts or chronic alcoholics, id. § 1182(a)(5), are afflicted
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either hearing depending on their point of apprehension.2 1 However,
if an alien falls within one of the fourteen non-coextensive categories,
he may be subjected only to the applicable hearing as set forth in the
statute.
2 2
The fact that there are more grounds for exclusion than grounds for
expulsion is consistent with the notion that aliens within the United
States should enjoy relative freedom from the strong arm of sovereign
power in its control of immigration. 23 Also consistent with this notion
is that even when an alien is subjected to an expulsion hearing, he is
afforded various procedural safeguards unavailable to entrants in
exclusion proceedings.
B. Proceedings
1. Expulsion Proceedings
In the expulsion process, which takes place near the alien's home,
24
an order to show cause must be given to the alien containing a
statement of the nature of the proceeding, factual allegations inform-
ing the alien of the allegedly illegal conduct, and a designation of the
charges and statutory provisions involved.25 Additionally, the alien is
with dangerous contagious diseases, id. § 1182(a)(6), are paupers, id. § 1182(a)(8),
have been convicted of or admit to having committed crimes of moral turpitude, id.
§ 1182(a)(9), are stowaways, id. § 1182(a)(18), are anarchists or Communists, id.
§ 1182(a)(28)(A), (C), and, at any time, knowingly and for gain encouraged, assisted
or aided any other alien to enter the United States illegally, id. § 1182(a)(31).
21. Compare id. § 1251(a)(13) (smugglers expellable) and id. § 1251(a)(6)(A) (anar-
chists expellable) with id. § 1182(a)(31) (smugglers excludable) and id.
§ 1182(a)(28)(A) (anarchists excludable).
22. Not all expellable categories correspond to excludable categories and vice
versa. Thus, it is possible for a permanent resident to become afflicted with tubercu-
losis in the United States and not be expellable when the same affliction would render
him excludable upon entry into the United States. See id. § 1182(a)(6) (category
excluding aliens afflicted with any dangerous contagious disease); Report of the
President's Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, Whom We Shall Welcome
179 (Jan. 1, 1953), reprinted in 6 Immigration and Nationality Acts Legislative
Histories and Related Documents (0. Trelles, II & J. Bailey, III, eds. 1979) (Docu-
ment 11) [hereinafter cited as Pres. Comm. Report].
23. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
24. See IA C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 2, § 5.6(c). While the Code of
Federal Regulations does not specifically require that expulsion hearings be held near
the alien's domicile, proximity may be inferred by the requirement that service be
either personal or routine. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.1(c) (1982).
25. 8 C.F.R. § 242.1 (b) (1982). Moreover, if the alien has been personally served,
he is advised of his right to counsel, the availability of free legal services and the right
to appeal at the time of service. Id. § 242.1 (c).
Congress authorized the Attorney General to prescribe regulations not inconsistent
with the following requirements:
1983] 1343
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entitled to notice of the time and place of the hearing no less than
seven days before the hearing date. 26 At the hearing itself, the immi-
gration judge27 must advise the alien of his right to obtain counsel and
of the availability of free legal services programs in the particular
district where the hearing is being held. 28 The immigration judge also
must ascertain whether the alien has received a "Written Notice of
Appeal Rights, ' 29 and must inform him that he will have a reasonable
opportunity to examine and object to evidence, to present his own
evidence and to cross-examine witnesses. 30
Expulsion hearings are open to the public, 31 and a decision of
deportability is invalid unless it is based on "clear, unequivocal and
convincing" evidence.3 2 The burden of proving deportability is on the
government; 33 the alien needs to show only the time, place and man-
ner of his entry. 34 If the alien is deemed deportable, he may appeal to
(1) the alien shall be given notice, reasonable under all the circumstances,
of the nature of the charges against him and of the time and place at which
the proceedings will be held;
(2) the alien shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to
the Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceed-
ings, as he shall choose;
(3) the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence
against him, to present evidence in his own behalf, and to cross-examine
witnesses presented by the Government; and
(4) no decision of deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon reason-
able substantial, and probative evidence.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1976).
26. 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(b) (1982).
27. The INS began to replace the term "immigration judge" with "special in-
quiry officer" in 1977, see 42 Fed. Reg. 46,045 (1977), although both titles are still
used in the Code of Federal Regulations, compare 8 C.F.R. § 242.16 (1982) (immi-
gration judge) with id. § 242.8 (special inquiry officer).
28. 8 C.F.R. § 242.16(a) (1982).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. § 242.14(a) (1982). The standard set forth in the Act required only
reasonable, substantial and probative evidence. See supra note 25. However, the
Supreme Court in Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966), stated that the statutory
standard applied to the scope of judicial review and not to the burden of proof. Id. at
282-83. Thus, the Court held that Congress had not addressed the question of degree
of proof, and determined that an expulsion order could not be entered "unless it is
found by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as
grounds for deportation are true." Id. at 286. Thereafter, the Regulations were
amended to replace the statutory standard with the Woodby standard without
distinguishing, as the Court had done, between the scope of judicial review and the
burden of proof. See 32 Fed. Reg. 2883 (1967) (codified at C.F.R. § 242.14(a)
(1982)).
33. See 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (Supp. V 1981).
34. Id. In presenting such proof, an alien is entitled to the production of any
nonconfidential document pertaining to entry in the custody of the INS. Id.
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the Board of Immigration Appeals; 35 an unfavorable ruling from the
Board may be further appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals.3 6 If the expulsion order is upheld, the alien may designate the
country of deportation,3 7 and in some cases may depart voluntarily38
to avoid the stigma of expulsion. In the alternative, he may appeal to
the Attorney General, who may suspend deportation and, barring
express congressional disapproval, may adjust the alien's status to that
of alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 39 Finally, if the
alien's designated country refuses to accept him, then depending on
the alternate plans made for him by the immigration judge, the alien
may apply for a withholding of deportation on the ground that he
would suffer racial, religious or political persecution in the country
designated by the immigration judge.40
2. Exclusion Proceedings
In exclusion proceedings at the border, the only prior notice that
must be given to the alien is a "Notice to Alien Detained for Hearing
by an Immigration Judge,"' 41 a form that is completed by the examin-
ing officer and generally given to the alien on the day of the hearing. 42
At the hearing itself, the alien is first informed of the nature and
35. 8 C.F.R. § 242.21 (1982).
36. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Of course, administrative
remedies must be exhausted prior to judicial review of an expulsion or exclusion
order. Id. § 1105a(c) (1976).
37. Id. § 1253(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). If the Attorney General concludes,
however, that deportation to such country would be prejudicial to the United States'
interests, or if the designated country fails to accept the alien, then the Attorney
General may, in his discretion, designate the country of deportation. Id.
38. Id. § 1254(e) (Supp. V 1981); 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(b) (1982).
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a), (c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.17(a),
244.1 (1982).
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (Supp. V 1981); 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1982). These
provisions have been strictly limited to expellable aliens. In In re Milanovic, 162 F.
Supp. 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd per curiam sub nom. United States ex rel. Mi-
lanovic v. Murff, 253 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1958), the court refused to withhold deporta-
tion of an excludable alien, reasoning that the alien had to be within the United
States "to meet the literal requirements of [that section]." Id. at 894. However, the
Code of Federal Regulations provides asylum procedures for excludable aliens. See 8
C.F.R. § 236.3 (1982).
41. 8 C.F.R. § 235.6(a) (1982). An immigration judge presides over both expul-
sion and exclusion hearings. Compare id. § 242.16 (describing duties of immigration
judge at expulsion hearing) with id. § 236.2 (describing duties of immigration judge
at exclusion hearing).
42. See Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 324 (1982) (notice dated same day
as hearing), see also 8 C.F.R. § 236.2 (1982) (no formal notice of charges); 1 C.
Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 2, § 3.19(a), at 3-182 (same).
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purpose of the hearing, his right to counsel, the availability of free
legal services, and the reasonable opportunity he will have to examine
and produce evidence and to cross-examine witnesses.
43
Exclusion hearings are closed to the public unless the alien expressly
requests that the public be invited, 44 and no provision establishes the
degree to which excludability must be proved. The burden of proving
appropriate entry status is on the alien, 45 and if he fails initially in that
burden, he may generally appeal to the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals. 46 However, an alien may not appeal an unfavorable ruling by
the Board to the court of appeals, but is limited instead to a petition
for writ of habeas corpus. 47 If the exclusion is upheld, the alien is
deported to the country from which he arrived. 48 The discretionary
withholding of deportation on the grounds that the alien will be
subject to persecution is unavailable to the excluded alien, as are
provisions for suspension of deportation and adjustment of status. 49
43. 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(a) (1982). The consolidation of notice and hearing is
"dictated by the nature of the proceedings. In an exclusion case the alien is seeking a
privilege and he must establish his claim, [whereas) in an expulsion case the govern-
ment is moving to dislodge a privilege of continued residence ..... 1 C. Gordon &
H. Rosenfield, supra note 2, § 319(a), at 3-182 (footnote omitted). This justification is
inapplicable to reentering permanent residents, however, who have already been
granted the privilege to enter the country.
44. 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(a) (1982). Under the Act, the alien is permitted to have one
friend or relative present. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1976).
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (Supp. V 1981). This provision has been judicially modified
as it relates to reentering permanent residents. See infra text accompanying note 115.
46. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b) (1976); 8 C.F.R. § 236.7(a)-(b) (1982). The Attorney
General, in the exercise of his powers under 8 U.S.C. 1103(a) (1976), delegated the
authority to hear appeals to the Board. In certain instances, as when an alien is
afflicted with a mental disease, no appeal may be taken. Id. § 1226(d).
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
48. Id. § 1227(a) (Supp. V 1981). The original statutory language calling for
deportation of the alien to the country "whence he came," id. (1976), had fostered
confusion and often bizarre results. See, e.g., Stacher v. Rosenberg, 216 F. Supp.
511, 513-14 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (holding that because United States was last place of
abode, permanent resident could not be sent to original home in Russia and therefore
was not deportable); In re Milanovic, 162 F. Supp. 890, 896-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
(holding that Yugoslav national who formulated intent to emigrate to United States
while residing in Belgium could not be sent back to Yugoslavia), aff'd per curiam sub
norn. United States ex rel. Milanovic v. Murff, 253 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1958); 1 C.
Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 2, § 3.25, at 3-208. But see Palatian v. INS, 502
F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1974) (Bulgarian permanent resident, residing in the
United States several years sent back to Bulgaria). It is still unclear, however,
whether the country in which the alien boarded the vessel refers to his initial entry or
his reentry.
49. The Act does provide limited exceptions to mandatory excludability, see 8
U.S.C. § 1182(b)-(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), including discretionary relief for
reentering permanent residents: "Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence
who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deporta-
tion, and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive
1346 [Vol. 51
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Strict judicial and administrative adherence to the language of the
Act and regulations, which places heavy emphasis on the location of
apprehension, will cause reentering permanent residents to lose the
important procedural advantages they enjoy within the United States.
While the reentering alien subject to exclusion proceedings has the
same right to counsel and right to present and object to evidence as he
has in expulsion proceedings, these protections are rendered virtually
meaningless by inadequate notice, the inability to appeal directly to
the court of appeals, and the absence of discretionary relief on perse-
cution or hardship grounds.50
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE REENTRY DOCTRINE
The judiciary has played a particularly limited role in policing
congressional and administrative policies toward exclusion and expul-
sion of aliens. 51 It has generally confined its review of legislative and
executive determinations to instances in which due process safeguards
have been jeopardized.5 2 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has at
times circumvented the rigidity of the Act's classifications by carving
out exceptions when permanent resident status was at stake.
53
years, may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General. ... Id. § 1182(c)
(1976).
50. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
51. Seven years after striking down a municipal ordinance discriminating against
Chinese launderers as violative of the equal protection clause, see Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886), the Supreme Court readily conceded that it
was not within the province of the judiciary to admit aliens contrary to the lawful
measures of the legislative and executive branches, see Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659-
60 (1892).
52. In The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903), a Japanese illegal alien
challenged the constitutional propriety of the proceedings at which he was held
deportable. Justice Harlan, while reiterating that executive action is not subject to
judicial review, stated that the Supreme Court "has never held . . . that administra-
tive officers. . . may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in 'due process
of law' as understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution." Id. at 100.
Similarly, in Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U.S. 673 (1912), the Court held that because
the due process requirements of a hearing and an opportunity to face witnesses were
fulfilled, a Chinese alien returning to the United Sates was properly excluded. Id. at
681-82; see Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116-17 (1976) (holding that
regulation barring aliens from civil service violates due process); Galvan v. Press, 347
U.S. 522, 530 (1954) (holding that deportable aliens must be protected by due process
..sense of fair play"); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596-97 (1953)
(holding that permanent resident cannot be excluded without notice and a hearing).
See generally Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 Harv. L. Rev.
193, 248-56 (1956) (discussing when aliens may be accorded due process).
53. See infra text accompanying notes 59-60.
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A. Evolution of the Reentry Doctrine
While courts gradually accorded due process and other constitu-
tional rights to aliens within the United States, 54 the status of reenter-
ing permanent residents, particularly in relation to the entry provi-
sions of the immigration laws, was initially unrecognized. In United
States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith,55 an Italian permanent resident who had
served a prison sentence for counterfeiting was held deportable after a
brief trip to Cuba. 56 Under the applicable immigration statute, an
alien was prohibited from entering the United States if he had previ-
ously been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude.5 7 Had the alien
never left the country, his conviction would not have rendered him
deportable as it was handed down subsequent to his initial entry.58
The Supreme Court was apparently unconcerned that an innocent
excursion across the border could subject an unwary permanent resi-
dent to the consequences of "entry."
Volpe's harsh implications were thereafter tempered in Delgadillo
v. Carmichael,59 in which the Court held that a permanent resident
did not "enter" for immigration purposes when he was rescued from a
sinking ship and taken involuntarily to Cuba before reentering the
United States. 60 The Court relied primarily on a then recent Second
Circuit decision 6' in which Judge Learned Hand prophetically stated
54. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950) (requiring full
and fair hearing for deportation), The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101
(1903) (same): Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (resident aliens entitled
to equal protection).
55. 289 U.S. 422 (1933).
56. Id. at 423-24.
57. Id. at 424-26. The Court in Volpe relied on provisions of the Immigration
Act of 1917, ch. 29, sees. 3, 19, 39 Stat. 874, 875, 889, 890 (current version at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1251 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)), which state in pertinent part that
aliens "'who [have been] convicted, or who [admit] the commission ... of a felony or
other crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude" shall be excludable, 39 Stat.
at 889 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (1976)), and that "at any time within
five years after entry, any alien who at the time of entry was [excludable] by law...
shall . . . be taken into custody and deported," id. (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(1) (1976)). Thus, Volpe's conviction prior to his brief trip outside the
United States rendered him excludable on his reentry; that he secured admission by
an immigration inspector in Florida did not prevent his expulsion on grounds of
excludability at the time of reentry.
58. The Court viewed "entry" as "any coming of an alien from a foreign country
into the United States whether such coining be the first or any subsequent one.'" 289
U.S. at 425 (emphasis added). Even though Volpe's initial entry took place 19 years
before his counterfeiting conviction, the Court looked to his reentry from a brief trip
to Cuba as an "entry" for purposes of the statute.
59. 332 U.S. 388 (1947).
60. Id. at 389-91. The Court noted that "the exigencies of war, not his voluntary
act, put him on foreign soil." Id. at 391 (footnote omitted).
61. Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947).
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that "Congress [could not have] meant to subject those who had
acquired a residence, to the sport of chance, when the interests at
stake may be so momentous. ' 62 According "due recognition" to these
judicial precedents, 3 Congress in 1952 enlarged the "entry" definition
in the Act:
The term "entry" means any coming of an alien into the United
States ... except that an alien having a lawful permanent
residence in the United States shall not be regarded as making an
entry . . . for the purposes of the immigration laws if the alien
proves ... that his departure ... was not intended or reasonably
to be expected by him or his presence in a foreign place . . . was
not voluntary. 64
The loophole created for permanent residents in this entry defini-
tion left unresolved the procedural issue whether exclusion proceed-
ings are the proper forum for "entry" determinations. Interestingly,
six months after Congress passed this new version of the Immigration
Act, the Supreme Court held in Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding6 5 that
the Attorney General was not authorized to exclude a reentering
permanent resident without notice and an opportunity to be heard. 66
The Court stated that "[f]or purposes of his constitutional right to due
process, [it would] assimilate petitioner's status to that of an alien
continuously residing and physically present in the United States. ' 67
62. Id. at 879. In Di Pasquale, a permanent resident who inadvertently passed
through Canada on a sleeping car from Buffalo to Detroit was held not to have
"entered" within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 878-79. The court reasoned:
[C]oncededly he was not subject to deportation except for his journey
between Buffalo and Detroit; he had a vested interest in his residence,
which could not be impaired so long as he avoided another conviction. That
interest [was] now to be forfeited because of perfectly lawful conduct which
he could not possibly have supposed would result in anything of the sort.
... [N]othing can be more disingenuous than to say that deportation in
these circumstances is not punishment.
Id. at 879; see Carmichael v. Delaney, 170 F.2d 239, 242-43 (9th Cir. 1948) (perma-
nent resident merely obeying navy orders did not "enter"); Yukio Chai v. Bonham,
165 F.2d 207, 208 (9th Cir. 1947) (per curiam) (permanent resident did not "enter"
when ship from Alaska made unscheduled stop in Victoria).
63. House Report, supra note 12, at 32, reprinted in 1952 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 1683-84.
64. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1976) (emphasis added).
65. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
66. Id. at 597. In Chew, a permanent resident seaman was detained and tempo-
rarily excluded without a hearing as an alien whose entry would be prejudicial to the
public interest. Id. at 592-95.
67. Id. at 596 (footnote omitted). Thus, by treating a reentering permanent
resident as though he never left the country, the Court seemed to suggest that only
procedures similar to those available in expulsion hearings would be appropriate for
such aliens. Id.
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With the exception of Chew, however, the Court seemed unwilling to
construe procedural provisions with the same expansiveness it ac-
corded substantive provisions.
B. The Fleuti Test
Rosenberg v. Fleuti68 represents the Court's most liberal approach
to the issue of permanent resident status upon reentry. In that case, a
Swiss national admitted for permanent residence in 1952 was held
expellable by the INS on grounds that he was excludable as a homo-
sexual at the time of his reentry in 1956 after a brief visit to Mexico.6
The Court, in vacating the deportation order, focused on the scope of
the entry exception in the Act 70 and held that the entry exception not
only included involuntary and unexpected departures from the United
States, but also included any excursion which was "innocent, casual
and brief."'' 7 Because the Swiss permanent resident's trip to Mexico in
1956 was such an excursion, his departure was not "meaningfully
interruptive of [his] permanent residence."'7 2 Therefore, he did not
"enter" for purposes of the immigration laws and was not subject to
expulsion.
Fleuti, under the guise of statutory interpretation, is striking in its
disregard for congressional and executive authority in immigration
matters.7 3 The reentry doctrine it enunciated, however, has been
implicitly accepted by Congress74 and has been adopted wholeheart-
68. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
69. Id. at 450-51. See supra note 45. The court of appeals set aside the deporta-
tion order, holding that the statutory term "psychopathic personality" was unconsti-
tutionally vague as applied to homosexuals. Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652, 658
(9th Cir. 1962), vacated and remanded, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
70. The Court avoided the vagueness issue raised by the Ninth Circuit. 374 U.S.
at 451.
71. Id. at 461-63.
72. Id. at 462. The Court outlined several factors bearing on whether a depar-
ture from the United States is "meaningful." These include the length of time the
alien is absent, whether travel documents must be procured and the purpose of
leaving the country. Id. If the alien intends "to accomplish [on his trip] some object
which is itself contrary to some policy reflected in our immigration laws, it would
appear that the interruption of residence thereby occurring would properly be re-
garded as meaningful." Id.
73. The Court cited Congress' intent in 1952 to incorporate the liberal Di Pas-
quale and Delgadillo decisions into the entry provision as justification for stretching
the literal meaning of the words of the Act. Id. at 458. A vigorous dissent, however,
stated pointedly that the majority was "constructing" rather than "construing" the
statute, a function that should be reserved for Congress. Id. at 463 (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
74. See infra text accompanying notes 102-04.
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edly by the INS.7 5 Subsequent elaborations on the doctrine merely
construe the extent to which a departure under Fleuti is "meaning-
ful. "7
Although Fleuti was an expulsion case, its reentry test has been
applied with equal force in exclusion proceedings, 77 resulting in three
different situations. First, if the reentering permanent resident is
found by the immigration judge to have made a "meaningful depar-
ture" from the country, he is deemed an entrant and may be excluded
at the border if the judge further determines that he falls within at
least one of the thirty-three categories of excludability. For example, a
reentering permanent resident who attempts to smuggle in nonresi-
dent aliens has made a "meaningful departure" within the meaning of
Fleuti and may therefore be excludable under section 212(a) (31) of the
Act.78
Second, if the permanent resident is found not to have made a
"meaningful departure," he is not deemed an entrant and is therefore
not subject to exclusion. In this situation, the alien may be admitted;
if his alleged violation was only an excludable and not an expellable
offense, such as his becoming insane during his initial residence in the
country, the alien will not be subject to further INS proceedings. 79
Lastly, if this admissible alien does fall within one of the nineteen
categories of expellability, he may then face an expulsion hearing
within the United States.80 This would occur, for instance, if the alien
75. See, e.g., In re Salazar, 17 1. & N. Dec. 167, 168 (1979); In re Valdovinos, 14
I. & N. Dec. 438, 439-40 (1973); In re Wood, 12 I. & N. Dec. 170, 173 (1967); In re
Guimaraes, 10 I. & N. Dec. 529, 531-32 (1964).
76. See, e.g., Vargas-Banuelos v. INS, 466 F.2d 1371, 1372-74 (5th Cir. 1972)
(since alien did not intend to interrupt status at time of departure, criminal purpose
formed in Mexico to smuggle aliens not meaningful); Yanez-Jacquez v. INS, 440 F.2d
701, 704 (5th Cir. 1971) (permanent resident, while intending to avenge his robbery
on a brief trip to Mexico, did not intend to interrupt his resident status; therefore trip
not meaningful). But !see In re Guimaraes, 10 I. & N. Dec. 529, 531-32 (1964)
(holding that intent to return does not mean alien did not intend to meaningfully
depart where trip required passport and other documents).
77. See, e.g., Maldonado-Sandoval v. INS, 518 F.2d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 1975);
Palatian v. INS, 502 F.2d 1091, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 1974); Itzcovitz v. Selective Serv.,
447 F.2d 888, 889, 894 (2d Cir. 1971).
78. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(31) (1976); see Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 328
(1982): In re Becerra-Miranda, 12 I. & N. Dec. 358, 359-60 (1967).
79. See Itzcovitz v. Selective Serv., 447 F.2d 888, 891-94 (2d Cir. 1971) (perma-
nent resident would not "enter" for purposes of excludability so that 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(22) (1976), excluding aliens who are ineligible for citizenship, would not
apply to him); Pres. Comm. Report, supra note 22, at 180 (If a permanent resident
would not be "subject to [expulsion] had [he] remained in the United States, [his]
brief absence should not create [a] basis for exclusion.").
80. See Maldonado-Sandoval v. INS, 518 F.2d 278, 279-81 (9th Cir. 1975)
(holding that permanent resident who did not make entry and therefore was not
amenable to exclusion under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20) (1976) as an alien not in
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was twice convicted of a crime of moral turpitude while residing in
the United States, thereby falling within both categories of deportabil-
ity. Thus, the reentry exception's broadening of substantive rights
affects permanent residents as a class, and is not conditioned on the
type of hearing in which it is applied.
C. Plasencia's Resolution of the Forum Question
Despite a few scattered calls for procedural justice,8' the judiciary
has not broadened the scope of procedural rights in exclusion hearings
to match the liberality of the Fleuti doctrine. In fact, the Supreme
Court recently emphasized the distinction between the substantive
and procedural rights of reentering permanent resident aliens in Lan-
don v. Plasencia.82 In that case, a permanent resident was stopped
with her American husband at the border while attempting to smug-
gle nonresidents into the United States from Mexico, and within
twenty-four hours of apprehension was found to be excludable by the
INS. The district court vacated this decision, relying on a magistrate's
report that a meaningful departure had not occurred and that Plasen-
cia was therefore entitled to an expulsion hearing. 3 The Court of
Appeals affirmed, reasoning that Fleuti was a deportation case in
which "[t]he Court neither held nor implied that the question of
Fleuti's 'entry' . . . could have been decided in exclusion proceed-
ings. "84
The Supreme Court reversed, noting that "[i]t is no more 'circular'
to allow the immigration judge in the exclusion proceeding to deter-
possession of valid immigrant visa, may still be amenable to expulsion under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(1) (1976) as an alien excludable at time of initial entry).
81. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 600 (1953) (permanent
resident entitled to due process "'without regard to whether or not, for immigration
purposes, he is to be treated as an entrant alien"); Stacher v. Rosenberg, 216 F. Supp.
511, 514 (S.D. Cal. 1963) ("Congress did not contemplate that the exclusionary
procedures would be used in a typical expulsion case."); see also Pres. Comm.
Report, supra note 22, at 180 (provisions relating to exclusion should not be applica-
ble to reentering permanent residents).
82. 103 S. Ct. 321 (1982).
83. Id. at 325.
84. Plasencia v. Sureck, 637 F.2d 1286, 1288 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd sub noma.
Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321 (1982). The circuit court mistakenly relied on an
earlier decision, Maldonado-Sandoval v. INS, 518 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1975), for this
proposition. See 637 F.2d at 1288-89. In that case, the court ruled that when
evideice appears during an exclusion proceeding that an alien is a permanent resi-
dent seeking to reenter after a brief trip outside the United States, the proceeding
shall be terminated. The INS may then institute expulsion proceedings to determine
whether the alien committed an expellable act. 518 F.2d at 281. The court in
Plasencia misinterpreted the fact that in Maldonado-Sandoval, "entry" was deter-
mined in the exclusion proceeding. Only when the Maldonado court was satisfied
that the permanent resident made a brief-Fleuti-type-excursion did it hold that
the alien had not "entered" and therefore could not be subject to exclusion. Id. at
280-81.
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mine whether the alien is making an entry than it is for any court to
decide that it has jurisdiction when the facts relevant to the determi-
nation of jurisdiction are also relevant to the merits."' 85 The Court
then held that the entry question may be properly determined in
exclusion hearings as long as they are fair.
6
The Court, while distinguishing the entry issue from the forums in
which it is decided, expressly declined to consider the alleged due
process flaws in exclusion proceedings as currently applied to perma-
nent residents.8 7 The Court merely outlined the steps necessary to
evaluate the constitutional sufficiency of exclusion procedures:
[T]he courts must consider the interest at stake for the individual,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [a permanent resident's
interest in residing in the United States] through the procedures
used as well as the probable value of additional or different proce-
dural safeguards, and the interest of the government in using the
current procedures rather than additional or different proce-
dures.8"
In light of the Court's willingness two decades ago to virtually
"construct" a definition of entry that would take into account the
uniqueness of permanent resident status, 9 the Plasencia Court was
exceedingly cautious in its strict adherence to the procedural require-
ments of the Act.90 Although the Court made clear that the Fleuti
doctrine could not be superimposed on procedural issues, it did sug-
gest that a court must balance the adequacy of minimal procedural
safeguards at an exclusion proceeding with the risk of erroneously
depriving a permanent resident of his previously granted right to
reside in the United States.
8,5. 103 S. Ct. at 328. The Court also noted that Fleuti "only defined 'entry' and
did not designate the forum for deciding questions of entry." Id. at 329 (emphasis
added).
86. Id. at 328.
87. Id. at 329 ("[W]e do not decide the contours of the process that is due or
whether the process accorded Plasencia was insufficient.").
88. Id. at 330 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)). The
Court then enumerated three possible procedural deficiencies for the court of appeals
to explore on remand, including burden of proof, id. at 330-31, inadequate notice,
id. at 331, and waiver of right to counsel without an understanding of the conse-
quences, id. Also, the Court acknowledged that Plasencia's hearing preceded the
effective date of the regulation requiring notice of the availability of free legal
services, but declined to decide whether the absence of this benefit was of constitu-
tional magnitude or whether the remaining procedures by themselves comported
with due process. Id.
89. See Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 460-63 (1963).
90. The Court stated that there was "no explicit statutory or regulatory authori-
zation for a continuance," 103 S. Ct. at 331, no statement in the regulations as to
burden of proof, id., and no statutory language suggesting that permanent resident
status entitles such aliens to a suspension of the exclusion hearing, id. at 326.
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III. THE PROCESS DUE A REENTERING PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN
Immigration laws are by nature restrictive because their purpose is
to protect the national interest in a stable and productive society from
the effects of a possible inundation of potentially burdensome and
undesirable aliens.9' Such excludable individuals include criminals,
illiterates, stowaways, vagrants, incompetents, subversives and other
disruptive persons. 92 This purpose is not frustrated, however, by af-
fording previously welcome aliens the procedural safeguards to which
they became entitled upon initially entering the country. Greater
procedural protection will not prevent the ouster from the United
States of aliens who are found to have violated the immigration laws.
Judge Learned Hand recognized this distinction when he stated: "It is
well that we should be free to rid ourselves of those who abuse our
hospitality; but it is more important that the continued enjoyment of
that hospitality once granted, shall not be subject to meaningless and
irrational hazards. 9 3
Administrative expediency has also been cited as a justification for
summary exclusion proceedings. 94 Because aliens at the border are
often first-time entrants, they possess no inherent constitutional rights
that would conflict with the government's interest in avoiding admin-
istrative and financial burdens. When constitutional rights of perma-
nent residents are involved, however, the justification of administra-
tive efficiency is less compelling, particularly when additional
procedures would produce only minimal inconvenience.9 5 Thus, with-
out disrupting what the Plasencia Court referred to as "[tlhe govern-
ment's interest in efficient administration of the immigration laws at
the border," 96 certain procedural safeguards already available in ex-
pulsion hearings could be readily adapted to exclusion hearings for
reentering permanent residents.
91. See 98 Cong. Rec. 2284 (1952) (statement of Rep. Walter) ("Taking notice of
the shocking percentage of aliens in the ... criminal element, the [Act] broadens the
grounds for exclusion and deportation of criminals, violators of the narcotic prohibi-
tions, stowaways, and deserting seamen."). See generally 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosen-
field, supra note 2, § 1.2 (growth of immigrant population leading to anti-alien
laws).
92. House Report, supra note 12, at 45, reprinted in 1952 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 1698.
93. Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878, 879 (2d Cir. 1947): see Pres. Comm.
Report, supra note 22, at 180.
94. See Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 330 (1982); W. Van Vleck, supra
note 6, at 27-28.
95. See Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 333-34 (1982) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part). For example, the paperwork involved in processing
an appeal from an expulsion order to a court of appeals compared to that involved in
processing a petition for writ of habeas corpus to a district court is virtually identical.
Compare Fed. R. App. P. 15-17 with Fed. R. App. P. 22.
96. 103 S. Ct. at 330.
1354 [Vol. 51
PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIENS
A. Legislative Recognition of Permanent Resident
Aliens' Unique Status
Despite the Plasencia Court's assertion that the legislative history of
the Act does not require expulsion hearings to be the exclusive forum
for permanent residents,9 7 there are other indications of legislative
intent to provide permanent residents with greater constitutional pro-
tection than that presently afforded in exclusion hearings. For exam-
ple, the policy of promoting and preserving the family unit underlies
many of the immigration provisions enacted by Congress in 1952. 98
The clearest manifestation of this concern is the comparative ease with
which aliens with relatives in the United States can obtain immigrant
visas.99 To do otherwise would result in splitting families apart with-
out the benefit of adequate proceedings, and would contradict this
well-defined policy.
Even more relevant are the Act's provisions relating directly to
permanent residents. Not only has Congress included a discretionary
waiver by the Attorney General of excludability for permanent resi-
dents returning to an unrelinquished domicile in the United States of
seven consecutive years, 100 but it also has consistently provided for
preferential treatment of immigrants whose relatives are either citi-
zens or permanent residents of the United States. 10 This statutory
coupling of citizenship and permanent resident status is evidence of
congressional awareness that permanent resident status is closer in
nature to that of citizenship than to that of a first-time entrant.
Furthermore, congressional reticence regarding the Fleuti doctrine
may be interpreted as acquiescence in the Supreme Court's more
flexible approach toward the reentry exception. This conclusion is
reasonable in light of Congress' otherwise assertive stance on immigra-
tion matters as demonstrated by amendments abolishing the national
quota system 02 and according greater flexibility to the Attorney Gen-
eral in designating countries of deportation. 0 3 Thus, Congress' defer-
97. Id. at 326-27.
98. See House Report, supra note 12, at 29, reprinted in 1952 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 1680; 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 2, § 2.18, at 2-138.
99. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1976); H. Kapner & I. Field, supra note 1, at 4.
100. See supra note 49.
101. See. e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) (1976) (excludable alien who fraudulently
procured visa may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General if he is
related to a permanent resident or a United States citizen), id. § 1251(f) (Supp. V
1981) (expellable alien who fraudulently procured visa may not be deported from the
United States if he is related to a permanent resident or citizen of the United States).
102. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended at
8 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (Supp. V 1981)).
103. Act of Dec. 29, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, § 7(a), 95 Stat. 1611, 1615
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (Supp. V 1981)).
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ence to the Court's handling of a traditionally legislative function-
the making of immigration policy-is an indication that it may not
object to judicial modifications of the statutory exclusion procedures
as applied to permanent residents. 10 4
B. Administrative and Judicial Recognition of
Permanent Resident Aliens' Unique Status
1. INS Regulations
While Congress has plenary powers to enact legislation regarding
the procedural rights of reentering permanent resident aliens, its en-
trustment to the INS of authority to promulgate rules renders that
body's determinations a viable alternative to legislative action. The
INS has recently issued regulations enhancing procedural rights for
aliens subject to deportation by requiring immigration judges to ad-
vise these aliens of the availability of legal services within the district
(or border area) in which the hearing is held. 10 5 The INS should
extend this practice of expanding procedural protections by establish-
ing new rules requiring adequate prior notice of exclusion proceedings
to allow permanent residents an opportunity to obtain counsel and
prepare a sufficient defense against excludability. 106 Such rules should
also embody the accepted practice of placing the burden of proof on
the government to establish excludability, 0 7 and should require a
higher standard of proof that would comport with the "clear, une-
quivocal and convincing" standard in expulsion hearings. Moreover,
an excludable permanent resident should be given some choice con-
cerning the country of deportation in light of the fact that his last
"abode" was within the United States. 08 Finally, rules should be
adopted that allow a permanent resident to appeal directly to the
court of appeals rather than to a district court via habeas corpus, and
which provide for the possibility of suspending deportation in a man-
ner consistent with that applied in expulsion hearings.
While such modifications appear virtually identical to procedures
available in expulsion hearings, significant distinctions would remain
104. Congress' acquiescence in judicial procedural modifications is already mani-
fested by the unchallenged adoption by courts and the INS of the Chew v. Rogers
rule. See infra text accompanying note 115.
105. See 44 Fed. Reg. 4651 (1979) (codified in scattered sections of 8 C.F.R.
sub ch. B (1982)). The INS also recently ruled that application for adjustment of
status to that of permanent residence may be renewed in exclusion hearings as well as
in expulsion hearings. See 43 Fed. Reg. 16,445 (1978) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 236.4
(1982)).
106. See Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 333 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
107. See infra text accompanying note 115.
108. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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between the proceedings which satisfy both the need for administra-
tive efficiency and the language of Plasencia. First, the proposed rules
would be implemented at the border, thus requiring only one hearing
to determine excludability rather than the two-hearing process sug-
gested by the Ninth Circuit in Plasencia v. Sureck.109 Indeed, it might
be possible to merge the exclusion and expulsion hearings in cases in
which the INS finds that although the reentering permanent resident
has not "entered" under the Fleuti test, he might still be expellable
under one of the nineteen categories in the Act. 110 Instead of admitting
the permanent resident alien and then instituting expulsion hearings
against him within the United States, the immigration judge at the
border could be authorized to conduct the expulsion hearing, thereby
avoiding the administrative burdens of multiple hearings. Of course,
proper notice of the imminence of such a proceeding should be
given."' This notice would include a statement that in the event the
permanent resident is found not to be excludable, his alleged conduct
may subject him to expulsion, to be determined at the same hearing.
Second, resident aliens may be paroled into the United States pending
the hearing as is currently permissible under the Act, 12 thereby pre-
venting detention difficulties at the border while additional time is
given to prepare for the hearing. Finally, the substantive criteria for
exclusion categorized in the Act would remain applicable to perma-
nent residents; hence, congressional authority to determine admissi-
bility standards would be undiminished.
2. Judicial Initiative
Although the judiciary is limited in its authority in immigration
matters, 113 it is obligated to scrutinize the constitutional sufficiency of
exclusion proceedings and has in fact taken the initiative in several
109. 637 F.2d 1286, 1289 (9th Cir. 1980) (once it is determined that an entrant is a
permanent resident, the exclusion hearing must cease and the issue of entry and
deportability must be litigated at an expulsion hearing), rev'd and remanded sub
nom. Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321 (1982).
110. Standard INS practice is to admit reentering permanent residents who have
not "'meaningfully" departed and then to institute expulsion proceedings if it is
deemed necessary. See Maldonado-Sandoval v. INS, 518 F.2d 278, 281 & n.6 (9th
Cir. 1975); see also In re V-Q, 9 I. & N. Dec. 78, 80 (1960) ("Once 'admission' has
occurred. . . exclusion proceedings are no longer proper and. . . expulsion proceed-
ings are required.").
111. Such notice would be appended to the prior notice of the exclusion hearing.
112. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see I C. Gordon & H.
Rosenfield, supra note 2, § 2.54, at 2-368 to 2-369.
113. The judiciary's role in immigration matters is limited to specific statutory,
treaty-related and constitutional grants of authority. See supra note 51 and accompa-
nying text.
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cases in which Congress or the INS had failed to provide sufficient
safeguards. Subsequent to the Supreme Court's pronouncement in
Kwong Hdi Chew v. Colding,14 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held that Chew was entitled to have the govern-
ment bear the burden of proof at his exclusion hearing. "'- The Board
of Immigration Appeals, as well as the courts of other circuits, have
followed this ruling even though it is contrary to the Act's explicit
direction that aliens bear the burden of proof in exclusion hearings. "'
In another case, a reentering permanent resident was held exclud-
able on the basis of an invalid visa, but the district court refused to
deport him to Russia, the country "whence he came.""17 Relying on
the Second Circuit rule that the country of deportation for exclusion
purposes is the country in which the alien had a place of abode and
which he left to come to the United States," 8 the court noted that the
only country fitting this description in the petitioner's case was the
United States. Therefore he could not be sent elsewhere." 9 Stating
that "Congress did not contemplate that the exclusionary procedures
would be used in a typical expulsion case," 20 the court rejected rigid
adherence to the Act's procedural formula given such anomalous
results.
Finally, Justice Marshall, in his partial dissent from the Plasencia
majority, chided the Court for failing to address the constitutional
sufficiency of Plasencia's hearing.' 2 ' Noting that the Court "need not
decide the precise contours of the process that would be constitution-
ally sufficient," 22 Marshall focused on the lack of prior notice, which
robbed Plasencia of a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that she
was not excludable. He also noted that the inadequate explanation at
the exclusion hearing of the charges against Plasencia, as well as
inadequate notice of the standards for exclusion, denied her due pro-
cess. 23 Furthermore, Marshall wrote that "[w]hen a permanent resi-
114. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
115. Kwong Hai Chew v. Rogers, 257 F.2d 606, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (per
curiam). As noted by the Supreme Court in Plasencia, the court in Rogers made no
mention of the due process clause in coming to this decision. Landon v. Plasencia,
103 S. Ct. 321, 330 (1982).
116. See 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (Supp. V 1981) ("Whenever any person makes ...
application for admission, or otherwise attempts to enter the United States, the
burden of proof shall be upon such person to establish that he is ... not subject to
exclusion .... ").
117. Stacher v. Rosenberg, 216 F. Supp. 511, 513-14 (S.D. Cal. 1963). See supra
note 48 and accompanying text.
118. 216 F. Supp. at 513.
119. Id. at 513-14.
120. Id. at 514.
121. Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 332-34 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
122. Id. at 332 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
123. Id. at 333 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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dent alien's substantial interest in remaining in this country is at stake,
the Due Process Clause forbids the Government to stack the deck in
this fashion, [and] [o]nly a compelling need for truly summary action
could justify this one-sided proceeding."-12 4
In sum, the judiciary may ultimately determine the contours of due
process to be accorded permanent residents in exclusion proceedings.
As neither Congress nor the INS has yet rebutted judicial attempts to
set appropriate standards in this area, the courts may safely provide
the speediest and most convenient forum to remedy procedural defi-
ciencies.
CONCLUSION
Permanent resident aliens enjoy various constitutional protections
by virtue of their physical presence and legal status in the United
States. The procedural safeguards to which they are thereby entitled
may be arbitrarily suspended if such aliens leave the country on a
temporary excursion and attempt to reenter. While it has been widely
recognized that the character of reentry is substantively distinguish-
able from that of initial entry, the procedural distinctions that should
logically follow therefrom have been largely ignored.
Adoption of various procedural safeguards would ensure reentering
permanent resident aliens a fair opportunity to litigate their exclud-
ability. Application of expulsion-type procedures would guarantee
reentering permanent residents the same procedural benefits that are
currently available for such individuals within the United States. Such
additional procedures maybe effected through congressional, execu-
tive or judicial action, as all three branches of government are, to
differing degrees, responsible for shaping policy regarding the rights
of permanent resident aliens. This action would not be contrary to the
strong national interest in deterring the entry of undesirable aliens
into the United States because violations of the immigration laws may
result in an alien's exclusion regardless of the procedures available to
him at the exclusion hearing. No justifiable impediments to proce-
dural sufficiency for permanent resident aliens exist to counterbalance
the extreme hardships such aliens suffer through inadequate proce-
dures.
Laurie A. Levin
124. Id.
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